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Into the Future Conference – May 2006
PERSONAL REFLECTIONS ON ADR REFORMS1

In our August 1996 Task Force on Systems of Civil Justice report to the
Canadian Bar Association one of our primary recommendations was to encourage early
and continuing non-binding dispute resolution to assist in achieving settlements as early
as possible in the litigation process. The report stated at page 32, "The Task Force is
persuaded that a focus on early consensual resolution of disputes holds the greatest
promise for reducing costs and delays" and, as we made clear in our first
recommendation, we wanted every jurisdiction to make available "opportunities for
litigants to use non-binding dispute resolutions processes as early as possible in the
litigation process." We envisaged that non-binding dispute resolution processes (or
"ADR") would form an integral component of the civil justice system, that the courts
would supervise the progress and pace of cases in a manner that would focus on early
and ongoing settlement and that all participants in the civil justice system would have
training, skills and obligations to help make ADR effective.
At the core of the Task Force's concern was the recognition that while the vast
majority of civil cases settle before going to trial, "…a high percentage of settlements
occur very late in the litigation process and therefore do not result in significant savings
of time or money for the participants" (at page 32).
Ten years later how have these recommendations fared? My answer is a
tentative one. From my perspective we have made some progress but the bold
objective of a broad use of ADR processes to obtain early consensual resolution of
disputes is still a distant target. Realists should not be surprised by this. Professor
Frank E.A. Sander of Harvard, whose address at the Pound Conference in 1976 is
regarded by many as the origin of the ADR movement, stated recently,2 "On Mondays,
Wednesdays and Fridays, I am amazed at how far ADR has come, but on Tuesdays,
Thursdays and Saturdays, I am amazed at how far it still has to go." It is my hope that
as a result of this conference we will make solid strides toward satisfying ourselves, at
least on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, that early, as well as on-going, ADR can
become a successful reality in our civil justice system in Canada.
Mediations and judicial dispute resolution processes are taking place in most
jurisdictions. Without attempting to be exhaustive, let me refer briefly to British
Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan and Ontario. British Columbia has had an opt-in
mediation program that began in 1998 for motor vehicle personal injury matters. It has
since been expanded to general civil litigation. Remarkably high success rates (75%1
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90%) have been estimated for the B.C. program, together with a high participant
satisfaction rate (82%), but the mediations are often occurring late in the litigation
process.3 The Alberta Court of Queen's Bench established a two year pilot mediation
project for Edmonton and Lethbridge effective January 1, 2005. The Alberta pilot
project is not a mandatory early mediation program, but is triggered, as in British
Columbia, by either party filing a request to mediate. Saskatchewan has had over ten
years' experience now in an early and on-going mandatory mediation system. It has
been reported4 that Saskatchewan's programme is receiving increasing support from
lawyers, clients and mediators, but it has experienced a relatively low success rate, and
the early mediation step, I am told, is often perfunctory or ignored. In 2001, Ontario
established a pilot project for Toronto and the Ottawa region5 to require early6
mandatory (with opt-out provisions) mediation in all but certain excepted civil cases.
Consistent with the Civil Justice Task Force the purpose of this rule was "to reduce cost
and delay in litigation and facilitate early and fair resolutions of disputes."
In November 2004 a practice direction was issued7 which had the effect of
removing early mandatory mediation requirements for Toronto actions commenced after
February 1, 2005. The practice note stated that Rule 24.1 "will cease to apply
automatically to civil actions in Toronto" but added that "mediation will continue to be
mandatory. Parties are expected to conduct mediation at the earliest stage in the

3
4
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filed on or after December 31, 2002.
Within 90 days after the first defence is filed unless the court otherwise orders.
(2004) 71 O.R. (3d) 97 (which reserves early mandatory mediation for wrongful dismissal and
simplified procedures cases).
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proceeding at which it is likely to be effective, and in any event, no later than 90 days
after the action is set down for trial by any party." The explanation provided for
abolishing early mandatory mediations in Toronto provided by the practice note is as
follows:
"The bench and bar are concerned about serious delays in the civil justice
system in Toronto. Waiting times to obtain dates for both interlocutory
motions and trials are unacceptably long and growing. Concern has also
been expressed about rising costs occasioned by the increasing number
of formal steps and appearances which must be undertaken (particularly
at the early stages) and the decreasing ability of counsel and parties to
determine on a case-by-case basis how and when to move their cases
along."
If early mandatory mediations in Saskatchewan and Toronto were not functioning
as effectively as intended, the important question raised is whether or not the Task
Force in 1996 was naïve in focusing on early consensual resolution of disputes. If early
mandatory mediations in Saskatchewan and Toronto had produced the success rates
referred to in footnote 4, it would be hard for me to understand why early mandatory
mediations would not, overall, produce savings in time and money rather than rising
costs, increased waiting times and added formal steps or, worse, be perfunctory or
ignored.
The thesis of this paper is that there are a number of reasons why early
mandatory mediation may not have worked as well as it might, and that there are
practical lessons that we can learn from these reasons. My main point will be that our
civil justice systems ought to institutionalize early mediation with incentives and
sanctions, but without necessarily taking the next step of making early mediation
mandatory.
Let me start by exploring some reasons why early mandatory mediation may not
always work. The discussion that follows is influenced by my own experience, but has
also benefited from articles by Dr. Julie Macfarlane, including her report on civil
mediation in Saskatchewan referred to in footnote 4 above and also her article on
Toronto and Ottawa entitled Cultural Change? A Tale of Two Cities and Mandatory
Court - Connected Mediation, 2002 J. Disp. Resol. 241. Reasons why early mandatory
mediation may not work include the following:
1.

Mediation premature: Mediations in my experience do not work well when the
parties are not ready for mediation. Parties need to be consensually committed
to the process and fully prepared. It is important for sufficient relevant
information to have been exchanged. Parties ought to have carried out a
reasonable front-end analysis and risk benefit evaluation so that they can then
negotiate effectively and the mediator can make meaningful contributions. If a
dispute is not ready for mediation, a mandatory early mediation can indeed
represent a costly and unnecessary step that has little chance of success.
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2.

Lack of skill and expertise: Mediations, particularly complex ones, benefit
enormously from skilled, experienced, proactive mediators. In my experience,
purely facilitative mediators, who do not nudge, intervene and occasionally,
carefully, evaluate, have difficulty in producing settlements in complex cases.
Equally, lawyers who are not effective negotiators or are not fully committed to
the mediation process create roadblocks to successful mediations.

3.

Tactics and possible prejudice: Some mediations are demanded for tactical or
leverage reasons only. Sometimes a party's motivation will be limited to
obtaining early disclosure of the other side's case. Not infrequently a party with a
very weak case will use mediation in an attempt to extract a relatively substantial
"nuisance" settlement. There are also cases where a party may legitimately fear
disclosing prematurely key elements of strategy, evidence or arguments. Crossexaminations are sometimes necessary to tie witnesses down on credibility
issues. On occasion, the other side may not have woken up to an essential
element of the case. In such cases trial counsel are often reluctant to tip their
hands prematurely.

4.

Resistance from lawyers: Some of this resistance may be for quite legitimate
reasons, which I shall discuss further below. Some resistance however may
come from those who are unprepared or unwilling to participate in an early
mediation process, particularly one that is imposed on them. There may still be
lawyers who view mediation as a fundamental challenge to their views of the
adversarial system, particularly when mediation is imposed on them. There may
still also be lawyers who feel uncomfortable or unskilled in mediation and resist it
for that reason.

My response to these concerns is that they can be managed in a properly
functioning early and ongoing mediation system. A properly functioning early mediation
system, in my view, would reflect the following:
1.

Lawyer resistance to early ADR can, in my view, be moderated by ensuring that
the court system is built on the solid foundation that lawyers retain the freedom to
assess reasonably whether and when mediation should take place and under
what conditions. Mediations work best when the proper conditions for mediation
exist. The obligation to ensure that such proper conditions exist rests properly
and primarily on the lawyers involved. If the lawyers accept their professional
obligation to consider, and where appropriate pursue, early and ongoing ADR,
and if each jurisdiction provides, as the Task Force in its report recommended,
opportunities for litigants to use non-binding dispute resolution processes as
early as possible, then early mandatory mediation, which imposes a burden of
proof on a party to opt-out of that step, may go farther than is necessary. Seen
in this light the retreat in Toronto from Rule 24.1.01 may be a positive rather than
a negative step. The British Columbia mediation programme and the Alberta
Court of Queen's Bench pilot project, which both employ an opt-in model where
either party may trigger a mediation by filing a request to mediate, give more
control back to the parties and their lawyers, and may be viewed as a more
Page 4 of 7
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favourable model than Saskatchewan's and Ontario's Rule 24.1.01's opt-out
approaches.
2.

Creating institutionalized opportunities for early mediation, if the mediation is not
mandatory, will in my view require incentives and sanctions to reinforce the
underlying importance of considering, and where appropriate using, early
mediation. The English Court of Appeal8 recently addressed the issue of
whether a successful litigant who refused to participate in ADR should be
deprived of costs. The court held that it was not the court's role to compel parties
to participate in ADR but that the courts could encourage such a state and
warned that "the form of encouragement may be robust". In that case the court
encouraged the use of case management orders which required the parties to
consider whether a given case is suitable for ADR with a direction that cost
orders may be made after trial if the trial judge concludes that ADR would have
been appropriate.

3.

If more control over early and ongoing mediation is to be returned to the lawyers,
it is essential for the lawyers to embrace fully their professional obligation to
"consider the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) for every dispute, and, if
appropriate, the lawyer shall inform the client of ADR options and, if so
instructed, take steps to pursue those options".9 The Halsey case, in addressing
whether a successful litigant who had refused to participate in ADR should be
deprived of its costs, stated:10
"The value and importance of ADR have been established
within a remarkably short time. All members of the legal
profession who conduct litigation should now routinely
consider with their clients whether their disputes are suitable
for ADR."
Lawyers in my view cannot now resist ADR because they do not like it or feel
unskilled or uncomfortable in ADR processes. It would, in my view, be
unprofessional conduct for a lawyer to turn a blind eye to this important and
developing aspect of the litigation practice.

4.

8
9

10

Whether in a given case to commit to early mediation will often involve a careful
analysis of a number of relevant factors. There are some cases, as the Halsey
case noted, that may not be suitable for ADR. These include precedent setting
cases, those involving important issues of law and the construction of
agreements that would affect future relationships, cases involving allegations of
fraud and disreputable conduct, and cases seeking injunctive or other relief

Halsey v. Milton Keynes General NHS Trust [2004] 4 All E.R. 920 (C.A.).
Rule 2.02(3) of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the Law Society of Upper Canada; see also
Chapter IX, Commentary 8, Canadian Bar Association Code of Conduct.
Ibid at 924.
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essential to the protection of a party's position. The court in Halsey also
recognized the dangers of claimants using "the threat of costs sanctions to
extract a settlement from the defendant even where the claim is without merit"
and where "large organizations, especially public bodies, are vulnerable to
pressure from claimants who, having weak cases, invite mediation as a tactical
ploy". The court also stated, "the fact that a party reasonably believes that he
has a watertight case may well be sufficient justification for a refusal to mediate".
The court recognized such factors as the cost of mediation outweighing the cost
of a simple day in court or a late request for mediation that might jeopardize a
trial date.
5.

Adequate disclosure of important documents, information, arguments and
settlement positions are critical to the success of mediations, and in particular
early mediations. Extensive discovery is not, in my experience, necessary in
most cases to permit a sufficient level of relevant disclosure to take place in order
to give mediation a good chance to succeed. Experienced mediators will
typically convene a pre-mediation meeting where adequate disclosure,
scheduling, concerns about fairness, confidentiality and potential prejudice can
be discussed. If there are legitimate concerns about premature disclosure,
tactical maneuvering or potential prejudice, processes can be set up with the
mediator to address those issues, and perhaps permit confidential disclosure of
critical information to the mediator alone or, alternatively, to defer critical
disclosures until the parties are close enough to settlement to justify disclosure.

6.

Preparation is fundamental to the success of virtually all mediations. Preparation
requires an adequate level of disclosure. It requires a careful risk/benefit/cost
analysis. It requires an exchange of reasonable settlement offers. It requires an
examination of underlying interests. It requires proficiency in the art of
negotiation and mediation. Preparation is not limited to lawyers. It must include
the mediator and equally importantly the parties themselves. Based on my
experience, the role of the parties should never be underestimated. Most
mediators in my experience will not be satisfied with a process in which the
lawyers dominate and the clients are all but invisible. Parties should not fear this.
If they are well prepared, and if they use effectively their own opportunities to
meet with their lawyers in confidence during the course of the mediation,
breakdowns in communication can be minimized and the clients can be brought
more directly into the ultimate decision-making process where their participation
and ultimate consent are essential.

7.

Finally, mediations, particularly early ones, benefit enormously from skilled
mediators. The more complex, the more difficult the given case is, the more
important it is to have a creative mediator who can draw on the wide range of
options and solutions that mediation can offer. While many mediators are trained
to be purely facilitative chairpersons whose primary duty is to assist the parties in
conducting their own negotiations, I favour, particularly in more complex cases, a
proactive mediator. A skilled proactive mediator will not impose solutions on the
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parties, but will use a wide range of techniques to help the parties evaluate their
risks, benefits and costs, identify and focus on their important and underlying
interests, will look for creative options, and will work in confidential caucuses to
get parties to look more realistically at their case and to make suitable
compromises. I can think of no single step that would do more to advance the
cause of institutionalized early mediation than the significant expansion of skilled,
available, proactive mediators.
Let me conclude by returning to the fundamental proposition that early
mediations can and do work and that the 1996 Task Force on Systems of Civil Justice
got it right when it said that "early consensual resolution of disputes holds the greatest
promise for reducing costs and delays". In addition to the mediation success rates that I
refer to above in footnote 4 (p. 2), I examined for this paper 25 fairly recent complicated,
but concluded disputes, in which I personally acted as counsel, mediator or arbitrator.
Ten of those cases involved mediation. Seven of those ten were successfully resolved
at or shortly after the mediation, reflecting a 70% success rate. Eight of the mediations
were early mediations and five of those settled at or shortly after the mediation session,
reflecting an early success rate of 62%. These success rates, including early mediation
success rates, fall squarely within the data reported in footnote 4. This leads me to say,
echoing my earlier quote from Professor Sander, that mediations in Canada are in fact
working on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays. On the negative side of the ledger,
seven arbitrations and three lawsuits did not settle but went to binding dispute
resolution. That represents a non-settlement rate of 40%, which is high on almost any
standard. A total of fifteen cases settled, seven which as stated above were resolved at
or shortly after mediation. That leaves eight cases that were settled without any direct
benefit from mediation. Of these, four (that is 50%) were settled very late in the
litigation process after significant costs and time had been expended. This part of my
statistical story causes me to agree with Professor Sander that on Tuesdays, Thursdays
and Saturdays it is amazing how far mediation still has to go! For all of the laudable
progress in ADR, our civil justice system still has challenges to surmount before it can
claim to have achieved the goal of early consensual resolutions of disputes occurring as
early as possible in the litigation process.
Personal Reflections - Paper (5)
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